Brexit – a view from north of the border by Wooton, Ian
123
15 Brexit – a view from north of the 
border
Ian Wooton
University of Strathclyde and CEPR
Citizens of the UK voted to leave the EU, but voters in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
expressed a strong wish to remain. Taking a trade perspective, this chapter argues that 
resolving border issues will be central to finding a Brexit outcome that preserves the 
UK in its present form. Continued membership of the EEA — with Scotland either a 
part of the same country or a fellow, independent member — would be the best outcome 
for the UK. 
Full disclosure: I am a Scottish, international economist with a career-long interest 
in preferential trading agreements (PTAs). As the Brexit vote has thrown up a PTA 
conundrum of unprecedented complexity for both the UK and Scotland, I feel duty 
bound to weigh in on what should come next. 
The result of the referendum seems to have little to do with the economic benefits 
or otherwise of EU membership. They seem to have been driven more by issues of 
sovereignty and a negative reaction to the Westminster ‘establishment’. Nonetheless, 
the implications of the UK’s trading relationships post-Brexit are important. A central 
issue is whether ideology or pragmatism will emerge triumphant from the negotiations 
that will soon begin between the UK Government and the EU.  
The vote
The result of the overall vote was clear, with a majority (51.9%) of those who voted 
choosing to ‘Leave’ the EU. But north of the borders in the British Isles there was a 
very different outcome — voters both in Scotland and in Northern Ireland expressed a 
strong wish to ‘Remain’ in the EU, with majorities of 62% and over 55%, respectively. 
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Finding an outcome that simultaneously respects the collective wishes of the British 
people, while addressing the concerns of the citizens in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
in order to preserve the United Kingdom, will be difficult. A dialogue has already been 
opened between the new prime minister of the UK and Scotland’s first minister. Prime 
Minister May has indicated that she does not intend to trigger Article 50 until she 
believes that there is a UK-wide approach and objectives for negotiation. On her part, 
Ms Sturgeon has established a commission to investigate Scotland’s options in light of 
the vote to Leave. 
The border issues are critical
I shall argue that resolving border issues will be central to finding a Brexit outcome that 
preserves the UK in its present form. As it turns out, the economic issue is not whether 
the UK is or is not a member of the EU. It is whether it remains part of the Single 
Market as a member of the European Economic Area (the so-called Norway option) or 
otherwise. 
While the EU has evolved in non-economic dimensions, at its heart remain the four 
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty of Rome ensuring free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and people. The Single Market encompasses all four of these elements and 
I would be very surprised if European negotiators would be willing to give the UK 
free access to some markets (e.g. goods and services) and not others (e.g. workers). 
Therefore, for the remainder of this chapter, I shall assume that for any agreement with 
the EU over these freedoms, the UK will have to accept all four or get none.
In my opinion, the best outcome for the UK (short of ignoring the outcome of the 
referendum and remaining in the EU) is what is frequently referred to as the ‘Norway 
option’. This would involve an application to re-join the EFTA, of which the UK was 
one of the founding members before leaving to join the European Economic Community 
in 1973. 
Why do I argue in favour of this? Quite simply, any other form of trading relationship 
with Europe would be costly economically and create political problems that would put 
further pressure on the integrity of the UK. Labour migration is a major element of this 
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and is the reason why I cannot envision a free trade agreement in goods and services as 
being a satisfactory solution (even when we ignore the enormous costs of negotiating 
and implementing free-trade agreements).
Were the UK to apply and be accepted as a member of EEA, it would retain full access 
to it largest trading market. In many respects, from an economic perspective, it would 
be business as usual. There would also be some repatriation of powers from the EU, the 
most significant of which might be with respect to agriculture and fisheries where the 
UK would no longer be part of the Common Agricultural Policy and would also regain 
control over its 200-mile fishing limit. Indeed, the Norwegian people narrowly rejected 
membership of the EU over concerns regarding their sovereignty over agriculture and 
fisheries. However, from the UK’s perspective, Westminster might not be the beneficiary 
of this greater autonomy. As these are not reserved powers, the default position will be 
that responsibility for these aspects of the economy falls to the devolved governments.
Would Britain exiting to the EEA satisfy Brexiteers? If, in the words of the prime 
minister, “Brexit means Brexit”, would this perceived increase in autonomy would be 
enough to satisfy those opposed to the EU? I don’t know, especially as membership 
of the EEA would involve both direct financial costs and continued acceptance of free 
migration. In addition, as a non-member of the EU, the UK would be unable to vote on 
issues of the Single Market, including many of the rules and regulations that drew the ire 
of those in favour of Brexit. Leave campaigners argued that the UK had little influence 
on the evolution of the Single Market, so little would change if the UK were not in the 
room to vote. Fundamentally, the UK Government (with its sole Scottish Member of 
Parliament) has to weigh up the benefits of continued free trade with Europe and the 
desire to regulate immigration of Europeans.
The EEA/Norway option is the least bad outcome for 
Scotland and Northern Ireland
My contribution to this discussion focuses on the impact of this decision on the people 
in the devolved administrations of the UK who voted strongly to remain in the EU. My 
argument is that the Norway option of EFTA membership is the least-bad outcome for 
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Scotland and Northern Ireland and is the UK government’s best hope to retain a United 
Kingdom.   
• First of all, continued membership of the EEA would resolve the potentially explo-
sive issue of a re-introduction of border controls between the Irish Republic and 
Northern Ireland. 
An outcome that restricted trade or factor movements would require border controls with 
passport checks, in order to prevent the Irish border being an open door to immigration 
from the EU into the UK. Any form of trade relationship short of continued membership 
of the Single Market could jeopardise the relationship between Northern Ireland, the 
Republic of Ireland, and the rest of the UK.
• Similar concerns arise with respect to the border between Scotland and England, 
although issues are less-potentially catastrophic in their consequences.  
Scotland’s first minister has indicated that the Scottish Government will explore every 
option to retain Scotland’s status in the EU, including a further referendum on Scottish 
independence early in 2017, if necessary. Given the strength of support in Scotland for 
the EU revealed in the Brexit referendum and taking into account that the franchise for 
an independence referendum includes younger voters (16 and 17 year olds) who seem 
to be more pro-European, the outcome of the last independence referendum may be 
reversed. Indeed, a series of opinion polls since the Brexit vote have put the ‘Yes’ side 
in the lead. 
Scottish independence would pose its own set of problems
Independence would however, throw up its own complex issues of trade and border 
arrangements. Whether an independent Scotland achieved immediate membership of 
the EU or initially joined EFTA, it would still be part of the Single Market. If the rest 
of the UK’s response to Brexit was anything less than being part of the EEA, a border 
would have to be established between North and South Britain both to monitor the flow 
of goods and to restrict the movement of workers between the two countries.    
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It might be argued that fear of a future border with England might convince Scottish 
voters to remain with the union, particularly given the deep economic linkages between 
Scotland and the UK. However, fear over the loss of membership in the EU seems 
to have been a decisive factor for some voters in the last independence referendum. 
This has now been turned on its head. A future independence referendum might now 
give Scottish voters the option of either Europe or the UK. As many of us in Scotland 
identify as being ‘European’ ahead of being ‘British’, it would be a risky strategy for 
anyone in favour of the union to give voters such a stark choice. 
Concluding remarks
In light of this, a Brexit agreement ensuring continued membership of the EEA would 
give the UK the best outcome, regardless of whether Scotland remains part of the same 
country or becomes a fellow, independent member of the Single Market.     
All of this suggests that the negotiations with the EU on post-Brexit trading arrangements 
will not be straightforward. Unfortunately, as was the case in the Brexit referendum 
itself, the final outcome is more likely to be determined by politics than economics. 
However, it will be the economic details of the deal that will have the biggest impact on 
standards of living in the UK. Resolving the complex issues around trade agreements 
will not only determine the future economic performance of these islands, but will have 
a major bearing on the prospects for the continued survival of the UK itself. 
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